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Many studies have been completed on factors affecting judicial decisions.  Studies
have focused on civil rights cases, economic cases, criminal cases, sexual discrimination
and obscenity cases, but no work has specifically looked at religious liberty cases.  This
work examines the factors affecting United States Courts of Appeals judges’ decision-
making in religious liberty cases.  I hypothesize that gender, race, religious background,
prior judicial experience, circuit, region and litigant status will all influence the way
judges vote in religious liberty cases.  The explanatory power of this study is relatively
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Many studies have identified the variables that affect the decisions of United
States Supreme Court Justices, but it is unclear as to whether the same variables affect
lower court judges.  Charles Grove Haines (1922) in his pre-behavioralist work listed a
series of factors that likely influence judicial behavior and revealed instances in which
personal or political ideology plays a part in judicial decisions.  Likewise, C. Herman
Pritchett (1948), in his groundbreaking book, The Roosevelt Court, studied the influence
of politics and values on the Roosevelt Court.  He examined non-unanimous decisions
handed down by the Justices in the years after the New Deal Constitutional Crisis and
concluded that political values and attitudes affect justices and the way they vote on
issues.  His conclusions challenged the traditional legal approach, which explained that
people adhere to judges’ decisions because judges make decisions “independent of the
control of others,” are “fair or impartial with respect to the interests of others,” and are
“expert in applying the rules that everyone, or at least, most people, agree should be
applied to resolve disputes” (Tate 1996). This definition implies that judges follow the
rule of law and do not respond to or vote their preferences in cases.
John R. Schmidhauser (1961) discussed the tendency of justices to disregard stare
decisis as well as the influence of sectional identification in the pre-Civil War period.
More recently, Jeffrey Segal and Harold Spaeth (1993) scientifically analyze and explain
“the Supreme Court, its process and its decisions, from an attitudinal perspective” (p. xv).
The authors examined all stages of the Courts’ decision-making process to try to explain
2
and predict behavior.  Their attitudinal model allows for the explanation of how the court
operates and why justices behave the way they do.  Segal and Spaeth “demonstrate that
the [traditional] legal model serves only to cloak - to conceal - the motivations that cause
justices to decide as they do” (p.1) and “explain that justices’ decisions are often based on
the political attitudes and values of the justices” (p.1).  Their subsequent study, Majority
Rule or Minority Will:  Adherence to Precedent on the United States Supreme Court
(1999), examined the role and effect of precedent on Supreme Court justices from its
beginnings with the Marshall Court to the present day Rehnquist court.  Segal and Spaeth
determine that stare decisis, or precedent, has very little impact and that Supreme Court
Justices vote their personal opinions most of the time.
Though these studies have focused on the Supreme Court, it is possible that many
of the same principles apply to lower court judges.  Harold Spaeth (1990) concluded that
the studies focusing on the Supreme Court may be applicable to the Courts of Appeals
because the Courts of Appeals “posses broad autonomy” (p. 317).  Additionally, Stern
and Gressman (1978) believe that the Supreme Court reviews too few cases to reverse
“every misstep by the lower courts,” (p. 298) therefore giving lower court judges the
ability to vote outside of precedent set down by the Supreme Court.
The Supreme Court, with its interpretation of the Constitution and ruling in cases
before it, sets precedent, which in turn helps to set policy in the United States.  Though
lower courts may not set precedent per se as the Supreme Court does, their policymaking
role may be just as important and influential as that of the Supreme Court.  J. Woodford
Howard (1981) called the United States Courts of Appeals the “vital center of the federal
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judiciary” (p.8) and with the litigation explosion since the 1980s the role and importance
of lower courts and their decisions has only increased.  It is estimated that “fewer than
one-half of one percent of Appeals Courts decisions are reviewed by the Supreme Court”
(Songer and Haire 1992, 964).  Due to the low percentage of cases reviewed by the
Supreme Court, “the role of the courts of appeals as the final authoritative policymaker in
the interpretation of many areas of federal law expands apace” (Songer 1991, 35).
Since the growth of studies on the Supreme Court, the public law field has also
seen numerous studies on personal attributes of lower court judges and their impact on
judicial decision-making.  These studies include works examining the United States
Courts of Appeals and state supreme courts as well as courts of first instance.  In an early
work, Stuart Nagel (1961) examined the effect of party affiliation on decisions in
criminal law, administrative law, civil liberties (not including religion cases), tax law,
family law, and business law.  Wheeler et al. (1987) studied State Supreme Court cases
and the effect of litigant resources on case outcome.  Songer and Sheehan (1992) also
looked at litigant resources but in relation to the Unites States Court of Appeals.  Songer,
Davis and Haire (1994) and Songer and Crews-Meyer (2000) studied the role the gender
of a judge plays in decision making in search and seizure, employment discrimination,
and death penalty cases.  Uhlman (1978) reviewed the effect of a judge’s race on
sentencing of defendants in trial court while Holmes et al. (1993) examined the effect of a
judge’s race combined with the defendant’s race on sentencing outcomes at the trial court
level.  Walker and Barrow (1985) studied the effect of gender on policymaking and the
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effect of race on policymaking in criminal rights, personal liberties, economic, women’s
policy issue and minority issue cases.
Conclusions concerning the effect of judicial attributes on lower court judges’
judicial decision-making are mixed.  Donald Songer (1990) concluded that Courts of
Appeal hear a wide variety of cases and the judges do have some discretion in their
decisions due to the inability of the Supreme Court to review all lower court cases.  Four
years later, Songer, Segal and Cameron (1994) suggest, “judges on the courts of appeals
are relatively faithful agents of their principal, the Supreme Court” (p. 690).
Though these scholars suggest that courts of appeals judges are neutral in the
sense that they follow the rule of law, and not personal preference, there is much
evidence that shows that judges do not interpret precedent or written law without being
influenced by their own backgrounds and prejudices.  Carp and Rowland (1983), focused
on cases involving criminal justice, government regulation of the economy, support for
labor, discrimination, and First Amendment freedoms, found that for cases in which
precedent and evidence are equally strong, for new areas of the law, and for issues about
which precedents and evidence are ambiguous or contradictory, the traditional model of
judicial politics is of little use.  The philosophy, attitudes and values of judges help to
influence the decision process.
Earlier works on lower court judges and the judicial decision making process are
fairly extensive.  Personal attribute studies are prevalent and cover a wide variety of case
types, but there are few works specifically examining religious liberty cases.  Religious
liberty cases began to surface in the late 1930s and early 1940s and since that time
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religious freedoms of citizens have been a focus of the Court system.  Justices and judges
alike differ on the intent and interpretation of the First Amendment.  The question is not
whether the government should establish a religion; or, should individuals be allowed to
exercise their personal faith? But rather, can or should the government have any
involvement in religion and what is the extent of individual religious freedoms?  The first
of these two questions is where many judges differ.  Some, following the lead of Thomas
Jefferson, believe that the wall between church and state should be high and impregnable.
Others are more accommodating, believing that the government can be involved with
religion as long as that involvement is minimal.  Given these different interpretations of
the First Amendment, the process by which judges make their decisions is important.
As lower courts have gained more power to influence policy, it becomes
important to public law scholars to understand what influences the decision-making
processes of judges in all types of cases.  Policy makers, outside the realm of the
judiciary, need to understand what attributes affect judges, and to what extent these
attributes affect judges, in order to better inform presidents who appoint judges and
members of Congress who approve judicial appointments.
The purpose of this study is to determine if attributes such as age, gender,
religious affiliation, party affiliation, circuit, region of country, appointing president,
race, as well as litigant status are determinant factors in judicial decision-making in
religious liberty cases.  It is hoped that the data and results will help to predict outcomes
in United States Courts of Appeals cases involving religious liberty issues.  Moreover,
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the results, along with those of other studies, might contribute to a greater understanding




The decision-making process of judges is significant because judges, whether at
the trial level or appellate level, make decisions that have an impact on American
jurisprudence.  Decision-making by judges is commonly studied through three criteria:
the legal model, the attitudinal model and the judicial role perception.
Legal Model
The legal model is based on the basic rules and practices of the legal community.
In using the legal model, judges may use one or more of the following criteria to make
decisions:  plain meaning, Framers’ intent, precedent and balancing.
Judicial decision-making using the “plain meaning” criteria simply means that the
judge or “judges rest their decisions on the plain meaning of the pertinent language”
(Segal and Spaeth 1992, 34). Plain meaning applies to the language of the Constitution,
statutes and words of judicially formulated rules (Segal and Spaeth 1992).
The second criterion for decision-making in the legal model is that of Framers’
intent.  This is generally applied to the Constitution, but can be applicable to statutes and
legislation.  Framers’ intent is the idea that judges examine a statute or Constitutional
principle within the context of how the original writers intended it to be interpreted; this
is done through the study of notes and documents (Segal and Spaeth 1992).
A third criterion within the legal model is precedent, or stare decisis, which is the
concept of using decisions made in similar subjects, by other judges in the past, as the
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basis for their current decision (Carp and Stidham 1993).  J. Woodford Howard’s (1981)
study concluded,
adherence to precedent remains the everyday, working rule of American
law, enabling appellate judges to control the premises of decisions of
subordinates who apply general rules to particular cases (p. 187).
The final criterion within the legal model is balancing.  Balancing is weighing an
individual claim with the interest of society.  There are no systemic guidelines for using
the balancing criteria, but it allows judges flexibility to decide individual cases on
individual merits (Segal and Spaeth 1992).
The Attitudinal Model
The attitudinal model asserts that judges decide cases “in light of the facts of a
case vis-à-vis the ideological attitudes and values” of the judge (Segal and Spaeth 1992,
65).  The attitudinal model suggests that a judge’s background, such as party affiliation,
education, location, age, gender, and religion, will have a significant influence on his or
her decision-making process.
Perception of Judicial Role
In order to understand the judicial decision-making process, there must be an
understanding of the role judges perceive that they have in the judicial process.  Judges
may perceive themselves in three basic ways: interpretivists, non-interpretivists, or
realists.
Interpretivist judges are those who believe their role is to interpret the
Constitution literally.  These judges practice judicial restraint and believe that they
interpret the law, not make it.  Non-interpretivists are judicial activists and believe in
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adding to the body of law already in place.  These judges believe the interpretation of the
Constitution need not be literal, but rather based on the original intent of the framers.
Realists are the midpoint.  Realists understand the need for strict interpretation of the law
as well as the usefulness of judicial fiat “but for most cases a decision can be made by
consulting the controlling law or appellate courts’ precedent” (Carp and Rowland 1992,
313).
Application of Theory
U.S. Courts of Appeals
The attitudinal model had its beginnings as early as the 1920s, but not until the
late 1940s did political scientists begin to give it a closer study.  Behavioralists, those
who desired to study the law scientifically, began to study the opinions and preferences
of the United States Supreme Court.  Within the judicial process, the Supreme Court
stands alone.  Members of the Supreme Court may have more latitude in the decisions
they make than lower court judges.  This is due to the nature of the Supreme Court
appointment.  Like other federal judgeships, appointment is for life.  Unlike lower federal
appointments, Supreme Court justices are not bound by political accountability, nor are
many concerned about political positions or careers.  In addition, the Supreme Court has
the ability to choose the cases on which it will rule.
The extent to which these models apply to lower courts is still uncertain.  Lower
court judges must be cognizant of how they are deciding the cases before them.  This is
not just because they are ruling on matters of law, but also because they may have to
balance their policy preferences with their career ambitions.  Lower court judges may
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have opportunities to be appointed to other positions in the judiciary and must be aware
of how their decisions may affect the possibility of being nominated and confirmed for
other positions.  In addition, lower court judges must also be aware of the possibility of
the cases before them being appealed.  Usually judges do not wish to make a ruling that
will be overturned on appeal and therefore are expected to follow the established law and
precedent.
Yet, lower courts must be studied differently than the Supreme Court, in part
because of their location in the judicial hierarchy.  It is expected that United States Courts
of Appeals judges will make decisions based on a combination of the legal model,
attitudinal model and their own perception of their role.
Judicial Characteristics
Gender
Gender studies within the judiciary were not an issue until President Jimmy
Carter’s increase of the size of the judiciary because for the first time a President made
the judicial appointments women. (Walker and Barrow 1985). Since that time and given
the continued increase in appointments of women in the judiciary, the role of gender and
its impact on judicial decision-making has become important (Songer, Davis and Haire
1994).
Studies on gender differences have found few obvious differences between male
and female judges (Gruhl, Spohn, Welch 1981; Kritzer and Uhlman 1977; Cook 1981;
Gottschall 1983; Davis 1986).  Gruhl, Spohn and Welch (1981) studied the conviction
and sentencing behavior of men and women judges and found no differences in behavior,
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except that women judges were more likely to sentence women to prison than male
judges. Walker and Barrow (1985) examined the effect gender and race had on U.S.
District Court decision-making. Looking at personal rights or liberty claims, criminal
rights, federal economic regulation, women’s policy issues, and minority issue cases,
they found male judges supporting personal rights claims 55% of the time as compared to
female judges 37%.  Additionally, male judges ruled in favor of criminal defendants 51%
of the time compared to women ruling 44% of the time.  Women supported federal
regulation of the economy 73% of the time as compared to 53% for men.  The study also
concluded that for gender-specific cases such as gender discrimination or sexual
harassment, there was little difference in the voting behavior of male and female judges.
Songer, Davis and Haire (1994) concluded there was no difference in the way male and
female judges vote in obscenity and search and seizure cases, but that women tended to
vote for the alleged victim of discrimination in employment discrimination cases.  In a
study involving gender and its effect on sentencing of defendants, Steffensmeier and
Herbert (1999), found virtually no difference in male and female judges, with the
exception of when repeat black offenders were involved.  In cases involving repeat black
offenders, women imposed harsher sentences.  Songer and Crews-Meyer (2000) studied
death penalty and obscenity cases from all state supreme courts and found female judges
are “substantially more likely to cast liberal votes” in both types of cases (pp. 756-757).
The question of voting behavior of male and female judges is an interesting one,
for while the number of female appointments has grown, the general expectation has been
that the judiciary would become more liberal.  This is attributed to the belief that women
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bring different experiences and perspectives to the law, as well as a different set of
methods and different desired outcomes than their male counterparts (Songer, Davis and
Haire 1994).  With this in mind, it is assumed that women will vote differently than men,
at least in some types of cases. The question here is whether  women vote more liberally
in religious liberty cases.
Party Affiliation
The mechanical model of jurisprudence suggests that party affiliation has no
influence on judicial decision-making while the attitudinal model suggests that values
and attitudes have an effect on decisions of judges.  The effect of party affiliation and
judicial decision-making has been well studied.  Early work, such as Stuart Nagel’s
(1961a), suggests that party affiliation is a better predictor of judicial behavior than
ethnicity.   Goldman (1966) studied judicial decision-making on the United States Courts
of Appeals and found evidence of voting patterns that are to some extent are “liberal and
conservative” on issues of political and economic liberalism, and that party affiliation is
associated with voting behavior.  A later study by Goldman (1975) revisited the party
decision-making relationship and found that it was even stronger than first believed.
Carp and Rowland (1983) examined cases for a 44 year period and found that for all
cases Democratic judges were 1.33 times more likely to vote liberal than their Republican
counterparts.  This voting pattern was even stronger for freedom of religion cases in
which Democratic judges were 1.52 times more likely to vote liberal as compared to
Republican judges.  Subsequently, Rowland and Carp (1996) found that the decisiveness
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of liberal voting by Democratic judges had grown to 2.71 times more likely to vote
liberally in cases from 1977- 1988.
Most studies confirm the suggestions of the attitudinal model, and go as far as to
say that party affiliation may be the best predictor of judicial behavior (Carp and
Rowland 1983). Judges may claim a political party affiliation before appointment, and it
is unreasonable to believe that judges shed this ideology because of their appointment.
Party affiliation and ideology then simply become a part of the judicial decision-making
process and can be used as an indication or prediction of voting behavior for religious
liberty cases.
Race
Early works on judicial decision-making did not include race as a variable
because almost, if not all, state and federal Supreme Courts judges were Caucasian
(Nagel 1961b). Most studies involving race have looked at either the race of the criminal
defendant or the race of the judge or both traits together and their effect on the sentencing
of criminal defendants (Goldman 1979; Walker and Barrow 1985; Meyers 1988;Welch et
al. 1988;Holmes et al. 1993).  Uhlman (1978) found no significant relationship between
judicial race and sentencing.  Gottschall (1983) studied federal appellate court judges
appointed by Carter and found that black judges voted to support criminal defendants’
and prisoners’ rights more often, but found no difference between black judges and white
judges in sex discrimination cases.  Walker and Barrow (1985), in their study of U.S.
district courts, found very little difference between the decisions white judges made as
compared to the decisions black judges made.  Their study of personal liberties, federal
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economic regulation, application of criminal law and general policy issues “consistently
revealed no substantial difference between white and black jurists” (p. 608). Welch et al.
(1988) found that black judges sent more defendants to prison, no matter their race, but
usually gave somewhat shorter sentences than white judges.  Holmes et al. (1993) studied
Hispanic judges and white judges in El Paso County, Texas, and found little difference in
the way Hispanic judges sentenced white and Hispanic defendants; however, white
judges seemed to sentence Hispanic defendants more harshly than white defendants.
 Race is an important factor to study because blacks tend to be more liberal than
whites on many domestic and some foreign policy issues (Campbell 1979; Ippolito et al.
1976).  The research on how minority judges vote in non-criminal cases is limited.
Minority judges are thought to be more liberal than white judges because of their party
identification, political socialization, socio-economic background and education, (Smith,
Michael David 1983) though studies have not shown this to be so. As prior research has
indicated, race is a significant factor in the application of criminal law.  The few studies
that have been completed on non-criminal topics reveal little difference in voting
behavior between minority and white judges.
Religion
Religious affiliation of judges may be a useful predictor of judicial behavior.
Religion is a socializing agent and it is seen as being the foundation or basis of a culture
(Leege 1993).  Nagel (1969) found that in the eleven state supreme courts he studied,
Protestant judges were more likely than Catholics to support the government in criminal
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cases.  Ulmer's (1973) study found that Protestant Supreme Court justices were also more
likely to support the government in criminal cases than Catholic judges.
Catholicism has been found to be a liberalizing factor in civil rights, religious
liberty and economic cases in Canada, the Philippines and in the United States (Tate and
Sittiwong 1989: Tate 1972; Tate 1981).  Songer and Tabrizi (1999) widened earlier
studies by adding Evangelical Protestantism to the scope of their study.1  Focusing on
state supreme court judges and their votes on death penalty, gender discrimination and
obscenity cases between the years 1970 and 1993, their findings show that Evangelical
Protestant judges are significantly more conservative than mainline Protestant, Catholic
and Jewish judges in these cases.  Additionally, their study
suggests that religious affiliation represents a set of influences on the
development of the values of judges that are separate from the partisan
sources that have been frequently studied (Songer and Tabrizi 1999, 523).
Prior Judicial Experience
Studies involving prior judicial experience for appellate court judges are few.
Goldman (1966) found that federal district court experience had little impact on the
decision-making process in the United States Court of Appeals.  In addition, Nagel
(1974) and Bowen (1965) found that there was little or no relationship between judges’
previous careers and their voting behavior.
The experience a judge brings with him or her is likely to affect the decisions that
the judge makes.  A cross-national study by Tate and Sittiwong (1989) found
                                                
1 Songer and Tabrizi’s term “evangelical” refers to a white protestant “denomination that
believe in Biblical inerrancy and salvation through Jesus Christ” (page 508).  For a
complete explanation see pages 509-510.
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“political/judicial experience produces greater liberalism on civil rights and liberties and
economic issues in Canada” (p. 914). In contrast, an earlier study by Tate and Handberg
(1991) unexpectedly found that there was no significant impact of prior judicial
experience at the Supreme Court level.
  Most studies dealing with prior judicial experience have focused on the Supreme
Court.  This may be due to the fact that many lower court judges are enjoying their first
appointment to the bench and therefore scholars have seen little need to include it in
studies.  U.S. Courts of Appeals judges do not all come directly from their positions at
law firms or prosecutors’ offices and have usually had some other type of legal
experience, and it is this experience that may have an effect on judicial decision-making.
Many have served as elected or appointed judges at the state or district court level.  Such
experience is important for understanding or predicting judicial decision-making.
Appointing President
Many studies on social background and personal attributes of judges and their
effect on judicial decision-making include the variable of the appointing president.  Carp
and Rowland (1983) asserted that presidents take into consideration the political and
philosophical ideas of possible judicial appointees.  Additionally, they conclude that
presidents usually get the desired decisions from their appointments (Carp and Rowland
1983).
In their study of judicial appointments from Woodrow Wilson to Gerald Ford,
Carp and Rowland (1983) found appointees of Democratic presidents were more liberal
than those appointed by Republican presidents. Segal (1989) studied what presidents
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desired from the judges they were appointing: Presidents Taft, Franklin Roosevelt,
Lyndon Johnson, Nixon and Reagan were highly concerned about the policy views of
judges that they were appointing.  Franklin Roosevelt, Wilson and Johnson desired
liberal-minded judges while Taft, Harding, Nixon and Reagan wanted conservative-
minded judges.
In a study of judicial voting in Indian rights cases, Stidham and Carp (1995)
found that judges appointed by Democrats voted liberally nearly 55% of the time as
opposed to those appointed by Republicans who voted liberally about 45% of the time.  A
later study by Rowland and Carp (1996) added Carter and Reagan appointees into the
existing study, and found that Democratic appointed judges were 1.47 times more likely
to vote liberally than their Republican colleagues.  In freedom of religion cases, Carter
appointees were 2.32 times more likely to vote liberally than those appointed by Ronald
Reagan (Rowland and Carp 1996).
Presidents seek to appoint those whose vote will be similar to their own
ideologies, yet judges are not bound by the political ideology of their appointing
President and make decisions independently.  Judges are believed to be free and
independent of political persuasion and, in actuality, most decisions made by judges are
done so independently.  The question of appointing President and its effect on decisions
must be in context with the level of appointment. Supreme Court justices are life
appointments and suffer no career influence if they vote against what the appointing
president expects. Lower court judges must weigh their decisions in the context of the




The United States Courts of Appeals consists of twelve courts that hear cases for a
specific geographic region of the United States.  “Studies suggest that each circuit differs
from the others in its interpretation of the law and its decisional tendencies” (Carp and
Rowland 1983, 86).  Goldman (1966) suggests that there are organized voting patterns by
judges on the Courts of Appeals, and these patterns tend to be either liberal or
conservative on issues such as political liberalism and economic liberalism.  Carp and
Rowland (1983) studied three time frames between 1933 and 1977 and found, overall, the
First (Maine, New Hampshire and Massachusetts), Seventh (Wisconsin, Illinois and
Indiana) and D.C. Circuit Courts were the most liberal and that the Fourth (West
Virginia, Virginia, Maryland and the Carolinas) and Tenth (Wyoming, Utah, New
Mexico, Kansas and Oklahoma) Circuit Courts were the most conservative. A later study
by Rowland and Carp (1996) extended the study to include Carter and Reagan
appointments (1933-1988). This study showed that the D.C. District Court and the First
Circuit Court voted liberally better than 50% of the time while the Fourth and Eighth
only vote liberal 37% and 40% of the time respectively.
The United States Courts of Appeals are located in all areas of the country and
each court is influenced by its location and the ideas of the people around the court.
Judges, as objective as they would like to be, are still influenced by their surroundings.
Each circuit court has a different judicial make-up and, therefore, may make decisions
differently in religious liberty cases.
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Litigant Status
Litigant status is important for predicting the outcome of court cases; studies
suggest that “upperdogs,” or superior litigants, defined as federal, state, or local
governments or their agencies, are favored by the Supreme Court (Barnard 1955; Snyder
1956; Tanenhaus 1960; Canon and Giles 1972).  Wheeler et al. studied litigant status in
state Supreme Courts and found the government, whether it is state or local, had a 60%
success rate in the courts.  Galanter (1974) agrees with these claims, but suggests that the
superior litigants are favored because the government attorney’s are “repeat players”
before the court.  His studies show that those who have experience in front of appellate
courts have greater success.  Songer and Sheehan (1989) studied “single shot” players in
Appellate Courts and found that those who are “poor” lose more often than others.
Sydney Ulmer (1985) studied the advantage of the federal, state and local
governments before the Supreme Court in civil liberties cases from 1903–1968 and
concluded that the government lost more cases than it won, but the difference was not
statistically significant.  He found “no evidence for the view that courts bias for the
government and against underdogs in civil liberties cases” (p. 908).  Sheehan, Mishler,
and Songer (1992) concluded that litigant resources and experience are less important in
the United States Supreme Court than at lower appellate court levels. Songer and
Sheehan (1992) studied the effect of litigation resources on the success of appellants in
Court of Appeals cases.  They determined that upperdogs (those with more resources)
win more frequently in courts of appeals.  Additionally, they predicted the order in which
litigants could expect to win:  the United States government, state and local governments,
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big business (such as railroad or insurance industry), other businesses, individuals, and
underdogs.
Litigant status may play a role in judicial decision-making.  In part because
upperdogs’ have the upper hand in terms of resources. Most upperdogs such as federal,
state, and local governments, as well as big business have greater financial resources than
individuals, and this gives them the advantage in court.
Region
Regional differences have always existed in the United States, and these regional
differences influence judicial decision-making.  In an early example of region and its
influence on judicial decision-making, Schmidhausser (1961) examined judicial behavior
during the sectional crisis in the United States.  He concluded that party affiliation and
region were inseparable for the cases between the years 1837 – 1860, but that regional
differences did exist. Tate and Sittiwong (1989) found region to be an important factor
for Canadian judges. Canadian Supreme Court judges from the Quebec region tended to
be more conservative than those from other regions.
Recent studies suggest that public attitudes and voting patterns vary from region
to region within the United States, and with this variation within the public, so comes a
variation within the judiciary.  Carp and Rowland (1983) suggest that judges within a
particular region of the country have ideologies that resemble the overall ideology of the
public in that geographic region.  Their study looked at the differences between the North
and the South and the East and the West and found modest differences for cases from
1933-1977.  A later study (Rowland and Carp 1996) suggested that in civil liberties cases
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from 1933-1988, the northern and western regions voted more liberally than the southern
and eastern regions.  They also concluded the difference between the North–South vote
has maintained a greater difference than the East-West vote.  In other words, the
differences between the way judges vote in the North versus the South have remained
more robust than those differences between judges in the East versus West.
Regional differences are likely to provide differences in attitudes and ideologies
of Courts of Appeals judges.  The differences between northern and southern issues have
existed for years within the United States and it remains an important variable to discuss
in terms of attempting to predict judicial decision-making.
Summary
Judicial and case characteristics are important predictors in judicial decision-
making.  Personal attributes of judges alone may be significant predictors of judicial
decision-making.  Case characteristics may also serve the same purpose, but the






  English colonists of early American settlements came to the new world for many
reasons.  Some came seeking economic benefits (Virginia, for example); others came
seeking religious reform (Massachusetts, for example); yet others were seeking to
establish a particular church denomination (Pennsylvania, for example).
Regardless of their original motivations, however, most colonies eventually
created established churches, and within these colonies the settlers were “no more
tolerant of religious dissenters than were those from whom they had fled” (Cord 1983, 3).
Though intolerance of other religions was abundant in many colonies, there were
exceptions. In 1645, the Plymouth General Court wanted to allow “full and free tolerance
of religion,” but was denied vote on the subject by the Governor (Urofsky 2002, 27).
Rhode Island, founded by Roger Williams allowed almost total religious liberty and
southern colonies were generally more tolerant of religion than their northern
counterparts (Urofsky 2002).
During the Revolutionary Era some states separated their churches from state
interference or control while other states continued to have state-supported churches into
the nineteenth century.  Many states continued to restrict “Catholics and Jews, imposed a
test oath for office-holding, and continued to finance the religious activities of churches
and ministers through taxation” (Urofsky 2002, 31).  Virginia, where Jefferson’s and
Madison’s influence for a wall of separation between church and state was seen, because
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the first state to grant religious freedom with the passage of the Virginia Statute for
Religious Freedom (1786). The Virginia Statute provided that
all men shall be free to profess, and by argument to maintain, their opinion
in matter of religion, and that the same shall in no wise diminish, enlarge,
or affect their unit capacity (Urofsky 2002, 31).
The debate over religion and its influence of or by the national government began
with the Constitutional Congress in 1787. The Constitution did not grant religious
freedom or prevent religion from being established by the federal government; it only
served to prohibit religious tests for federal office (Article VI Sec 3). It is important to
note that Article VI Section 3 only pertains to the federal government; thus state
governments remained free to employ religious tests or oaths. The Constitution was
ratified in 1787-1788 on the condition that the Bill of Rights would be added to protect
certain human rights. Included in these rights was the desire by the states to have an
amendment
to prevent the establishment of a national religion or the education of a
particular religious sect to preferred status as well as to prohibit
interference by the national government with an individual’s freedom of
religious belief (Cord 1982, 6).
The first Congress met in 1789 and was headed by James Madison; the Bill Of Rights
was written and ratified by 1791. The First Amendment of the United States Constitution
states “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting
the free exercise thereof.”  These clauses, taken together, provide protection of and from
religions being created by the federal government.
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Application To The States
Fourteenth Amendment
Thomas Jefferson, James Madison and other founding fathers understood that the
Bill of Rights in general and the religious freedoms in the First Amendment specifically
were targeted toward the federal government. As early as 1833, in Barron v. Baltimore,
the Supreme Court ruled that the Fifth Amendment was a restraint on the federal
government.  This decision led to the logical conclusion that the first eight amendments
were applicable only to the federal government and not to the individual states. In 1845,
the Supreme Court ruled that the religious clauses of the First Amendment were
applicable only to the federal government.2
The Fourteenth Amendment, added in 1868, says “no state shall make or enforce
any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process of
law...;” with its passage came a new wave of cases attempting “to apply the governmental
restrictions of the Bill of Rights to the states” (Cord 1982, 89).  This attempt came from
two clauses within the Fourteenth Amendment, Section 1: the Privileges and Immunities
Clause and the Due Process Clause.
The first attempt to apply the privileges and immunities clauses to the states came
through the Slaughter- House cases in 1873. The court ruled, by a 5-4 vote, “citizenship
in the states and the United States to be distinct and separate and the Fourteenth
Amendment to apply only to National Citizenship” (O’Brien 1997, 246). In short, the
                                                
2 Permoli v. New Orleans 1845.
25
court ruled that the Bill of Rights was still not applicable to the states, at least not through
the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
While the privileges and immunities clause was being denied application to the
states, there were cases in the courts attempting to make the Due Process clause
applicable to the states.  The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is an
exact copy of the Due Process Clause in the Fifth Amendment. The concept of “due
process” comes from English common law as far back as the Magna Carta (1215) and is
generally understood to mean “the law of the land” (O’Brien 1997, 247). In other words,
the Due Process Clause served as a procedural restraint on the power of the government,
but this will not remain the only interpretation of the clause after the addition of the
Fourteenth Amendment.  In Davidson v. New Orleans (96 U.S. 97 1878), it was argued
that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment was not only a procedural
restraint, but also a substantive restraint of governmental power (Cord 1982). Substantive
constitutional rights are those that tend to limit the legislative goals that a constitutional
government might legitimately pursue (Cord 1982, 96, n 33). Justice Miller, writing for
the court, refused to interpret the Due Process Clause substantively. He wrote:
There is here abundant evidence that there exists some strange
misconception of the scope of this provision as found in the Fourteenth
Amendment. In fact, it would seem, from the character of many of the
cases before us, and the arguments made in them, that the clause under
consideration is looked upon as a means of bringing to the test of the
decision of this court the abstract opinions of every unsuccessful litigant in
a State court of justice of the decision against him, and of the merits of the
legislation on which such a decision may be founded (O’Brien 1997, 248).
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In Hurtado v. California (110 U.S. 516, 1884) the court declared that the states
did not have to abide by the Fifth Amendment’s requirement of an indictment by a grand
jury, but rather that the Fourteenth Amendment due process clause allows for each state
to “experiment with [its] own criminal justice procedures” (O’Brien 1997, 295).
The “progressive era” of politics led to attempts to stop corporate or big business
abuses by states’ enacting laws and commissions to regulate business practices and to
guarantee production and employment standards. The Supreme Court responded with its
laissez-faire economic policies by “declaring unconstitutional under the Fourteenth
Amendment these state legislative and administrative attempts to regulate private
enterprises and property.” (O’Brien 1997, 295)3 With these decisions, the court
established substantive rights regarded as “liberties,” and though these economic rights
were not an application of the Bill Of Rights to the states it opened up the ability to argue
on substantive rights.
Though several cases were argued and won on substantive arguments,4 the
Supreme Court’s view of the relationship of the Bill of Rights and Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment remained unchanged until 1925. Gitlow v New York (268
U.S. 652, 1925) argument was that the First Amendment freedoms of speech and the
press were extended to state governments through the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The Court said:
                                                
3 See Chicago; Milwaukee and St Paul Ry. Co. v. Minnesota 134 US 418 (1890);
Allguyer v. LA 165 US 578 (1897); Lochner v. NY 198 US 45 (1950); Adkins v.
Children’s Hospital 261 US 525 (1923).
4 Meyer v. Nebraska 262 US 390 (1923); Pierce v. Society of Sisters 268 US 510 (1925)
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For present purposes we may and do assume that freedom of speech and
of the press – which are protected by the First Amendment from
abridgement by Congress – are among the fundamental personal rights and
“liberties” protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment from impairment by the states (Cord 1982, 99-100).
By the 1940s, and in a series of cases, the First Amendment and the freedom it




Case history on religious liberty is extensive.  An early decision stated that the
First Amendment was designed to allow all people under the law of the United States to
have their own ideas about their relationship to the Maker and the worship thereof.  This
decision also prohibits legislation that supports any sects’ form of worship (Davis v
Beason, 133 U.S. 333, 1890).  For nearly 150 years, the First Amendment was applicable
only to the federal government, which allowed state and local governments some
interaction between government and religion.  Shortly after the Palko v Connecticut, (302
U.S. 319, 1937) decision that made the First Amendment applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, religious liberty cases began making their way through the
court system.
These early cases would be termed religious liberty cases today, but were decided
on the basis of free speech6 (Rotmen 1942).  The first case truly decided on the basis of
                                                
5 See Near v Minnesota 283 US 697 (1931); Powell v Alabama 287 US 45 (1932);
Hamilton v Regents of the University of California 293 US 245 (1934); DeJorge v
Oregon 299 US 353 (1937).
28
religious liberty was Cantwell v Connecticut (310 U.S. 296, 1940), which served two
purposes.  The first purpose was to set down the basic interpretation of the concept of
free exercise.  The Court ruled that the right to think and believe what one wishes about
religion is absolute, while actions along with these thoughts and beliefs are subject to
limitation for the cause of peace and order.  The second purpose was to make the free
exercise clause of the First Amendment applicable to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Each clause of the First Amendment provides a different protection for the
citizens of the United States and therefore deserve separate discussions.  The first clause
known as the free exercise clause provides freedom from coercion by the government in
choosing a religion or no religion.  Free exercise of religion is not an absolute as
“individuals may be prosecuted for certain religious practices and compelled to comply
with regulations and laws that contravene their religious beliefs” (O’Brien 1994, 727).
Though free exercise is not an absolute, it has been strictly applied to the government in
that the government must remain neutral with regard to religion.
Free exercise case law pre-dates Cantwell by about forty years.  Reynolds v U.S.,
98 U.S. 145 (1879), which originated in the Utah territory, banned the practice of
polygamy even in the context of the Mormon religion.  After Cantwell, free exercise
cases before the Supreme Court become common.  In Minersville School District v
Gobitis 310 U.S. 586 (1940), the Supreme Court ruled that compulsory flag saluting in
                                                                                                                                                
6 These cases involved Jehovah’s Witnesses on a variety of issues ranging form
solicitation and handbill distribution to flag saluting.  For a complete discussion of these
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public schools did not violate the Constitutional rights of Jehovah’s Witness
schoolchildren.  Justice Frankfurter argued that the legislation requiring flag saluting was
“of general scope and not directed against doctrinal loyalties of particular sects”
(Minersville v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 , 1940).  Three years later the Court reversed itself
in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette 319 U.S. 624 (1943).  In this case,
Justice Jackson explained that
local authorities in compelling the flag salute and pledge transcends
constitutional limitations on their power and invades the sphere of the
intellect and spirit which it is the purpose of the First Amendment
(O’Brien 1994, 620; West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette
319 U.S. 624, 1943).
Additionally, the Court upheld the laws requiring the closing of business on Sundays over
objections by Orthodox Jews7 as well as the prohibition of handbills and solicitation on
fairgrounds8.
The rulings in these cases all sought neutrality and the enforcement of the secular
regulation principle.  In Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S 398 (1963) the Court created an
exception to the strict state neutrality principle with the “least drastic means” test.
Basically, the least drastic means test allows for the Court, when accommodating free
exercise claims, to balance “those claims against competing governmental interests,
taking into consideration the nature of the regulation, the centrality of a religious belief,
and the equality in treatment of religion” (O’Brien 1994, 793).  In Sherbert, the Court
                                                                                                                                                
cases see Rotmen, Victor W.  (1942) “Recent Restrictions Upon Religious Liberty.”
American Political Science Review 36:6 1053-1068.
7 McGowan v Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, (1961) and Braunfeld v Brown 366 U.S. 599,
(1961)
8 Heffron v International Society for Krishna Consciousness 452 U.S. 640, (1981)
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struck down a South Carolina law that denied unemployment compensation to a Seventh
Day Adventist who refused to work on the Sabbath.  This principle was also applied in
Wisconsin v Yoder 406 U.S. 205 (1972), which allowed for an exception to Wisconsin’s
compulsory school attendance law for the Amish after the eighth grade.
The use of the least drastic means test does not always result in favor of the
religious principle before the Court.  On occasion, the Court has ruled that the
government’s interest “may simply outweigh free exercise claims, despite their coercive
effect on religious beliefs and practices” (O’Brien 1994).  In Goldman v Weinberger, 475
U.S. 503 (1986), the Court ruled that the military has the ability to deny the wearing of
religious garb, in this case a yarmulke.  In addition, the government’s position of the need
for citizens to have Social Security Numbers, even in cases where it is objected to on
religious grounds, was upheld in Bowen v Roy 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
Establishment Clause
The second part of the First Amendment is the Establishment Clause, which can
be interpreted in two ways.  The first is that the clause outlaws only the creation of an
official church by the United States government.  The second interpretation is much
broader and encompasses “any government support or connection with religion”
(Pritchett 1984).  With these definitions in mind, the decisions in establishment cases
have fallen into three interpretations:  strict separation, strict neutrality, and
accommodationists.  Strict separation is based on Thomas Jefferson’s metaphorical “wall
of separation between church and state.”  Jefferson stated this idea at the founding of the
United States, but it was not put into use until the case of Everson v. Board of Education
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of Ewing Township, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).  The Vinson Court ruled in favor of the
reimbursement of transportation costs to parents of children attending private parochial
schools, but did so, not because it benefited the religious school, but the parents directly.
In Justice Black’s opinion for the majority in Everson, he wrote, “The First Amendment
has erected a wall between church and state.  That wall must be kept high and
impregnable.  We could not approve the slightest breach.”
In the 1948 case of McCollum v. Board of Education, 333 U.S. 203, the Court
struck down a program that allowed students to voluntarily attend religious instruction by
non-school related instructors on school grounds.  But, four years later the Court ruled
that a released time program in which students received religious education “off-campus”
did not breach the wall of separation.9
Following rulings by the Vinson Court, the Warren Court generally kept the wall
of separation high.  In Engel v. Vitale 370 U.S. 421 (1962), the Court struck down a New
York law requiring the recitation of a nondenominational prayer at the beginning of each
school day.  A year later, in Abington School District v. Schempp 374 U.S. 203 (1963) the
Court ruled that required recitation of the Lord’s Prayer and Bible reading in a public
school classroom also violated the Establishment clause.   In this ruling the Court laid
down the principle of the “secular purpose test.”  This test stated, “to withstand the
strictures of the Establishment clause, there must be a secular purpose and a primary
effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.”  This test was used in Epperson v.
                                                
9 Zorach v Clauson 343 US 306 (1952)
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Arkansas 393 U.S. 97 (1968) to strike down the law forbidding the teaching of evolution
in public schools or publicly funding colleges.
The Supreme Court began to shift to a more accommodationist view under Chief
Justice Burger.  The idea of excessive governmental entanglement was introduced in the
case of Walz v. Tax Commission of the City of New York 397 U.S. 664 (1971).  This case
involved a tax law, which stated that tax exemption status for property could only be for
those properties that were solely for religious use.  The Court ruled,
either course, taxation of churches or exemptions, occasions some degree
of involvement with religion…[The question is] whether it is…leading to
an impermissible degree of entanglement (Pritchett 1994, 123).
The Court ruled tax exemption status in this case did not lead to excessive entanglement.
A year later in Lemon v. Kurtzman 403 U.S. 602 (1972), the Burger Court created
a three-pronged test for cases involving the Establishment clause.  The Lemon Test set
down that a law or government policy must, (1) have a secular purpose, (2) have a
principal or primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion and (3) not
excessively entangle the government with religion.
Though the Lemon test helped create consistency in determining which cases
reached the Supreme Court, it did not.  The Rehnquist Court has been bitterly divided on
the application and even the validity of the Lemon test, and it has been split on the issue
of the Lemon test numerous times.  The ambiguity of the Lemon test can be seen in Lynch
v. Donnelly 465 U.S. 688 (1984) and County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties
Union Greeter Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573 (1987).  In Lynch v. Donnelly, the Court
narrowly upheld the use of a city sponsored crèche scene during the Christmas season in
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Pawtucket, Rhode Island by finding no excessive entanglement between government and
religion.  Three years later in County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union
Greeter Pittsburgh Chapter, the Court limited Lynch by ruling that a crèche scene inside
a city building violated the Establishment Clause.  In Wallace v. Jaffree 472 U.S. 38
(1985), the Court ruled against a statute in Alabama mandating a moment of silence to
begin the school day, citing the lack of a secular purpose for the law.  The narrow
majority decision in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992), held that school-sponsored
prayers at graduation ceremonies “places public pressure as well as peer pressure” for
those in attendance to be respectful during the time of prayer and thereby violates the
Establishment clause.
Religious liberty has been an issue in the Unites States since its formation.
Religious liberty will cases will continue to set precedent for years to come.  The job of
Justices and judges alike is to rule on religious liberty cases on the basis of the law while




The data in this study consist of votes cast by judges on the United States Courts
of Appeals from 1940 to January 2002 in religious liberty cases.  The data begin with the
1940 Supreme Court decision of Cantwell v. Connecticut and continues to February
2002.  Cantwell is the logical starting point for this research as it is the first case in which
the religion clauses in the First Amendment were applied to the states through the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.  Cases were collected using the Westlaw
internet database of court cases.  A key word search, using the words “free” and
“exercise” within two words of one another, was used to search the Courts of appeals
cases.  The database includes all circuits after 1944 and the US Courts of Appeals cases
from 1891-1945 database.
This process found 870 cases and a content analysis of each of these cases was
conducted to find the appropriate religious speech, Free Exercise, Establishment Clause
and conscientious objector cases.  This analysis removed cases that were considered to be
free speech, free association or labor relation cases.  In addition, the content analysis
removed all cases involving religious questions in prisons.  These cases were excluded
due to the fact that prisoners’ rights and freedoms are limited for the protection and order
of the criminal justice system.  Such cases were excluded because prisoner cases
generally consist of a prisoner or inmate petitioning for the ability to practice some type
of religious activity and the inclusion of prisoner cases, which are most often lost by the
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prisoner, would likely skew the results of this study10.  Of the 870 original cases, 225
cases were found to deal with religious speech, Establishment Clause, Free Exercise or
conscientious objector issues.
A content analysis was then completed on the 225 cases included in the study.
Each case was identified and coded as a religious speech, an Establishment Clause or a
Free Exercise Clause case.  Cases determined to be more than one type were coded as
such so categories are not mutually exclusive.  The case characteristics of circuit, region
and federal government involvement were also coded for each case.
After coding the case characteristics, each judge presiding over a case was listed
along with their gender, date of birth, party affiliation, religion, race, appointing
president, and previous judicial experience.
  Finally, each vote by each judge was coded as either a conservative vote or a
liberal vote.  Conservative votes are defined as those instances in which the judge voted
to protect the church or to expand religion or a religious activity.  Liberal votes are
defined as those instances in which the judge is voting against the church (not to protect
it) or to restrict or constrict religion or a religious activity.
After the collection and coding of data a LOGIT analysis was utilized.  The
LOGIT model provides a more accurate indication of the data rather than a linear
regression model.  A LOGIT analysis “provides a global test for significance of a set of
predictors in the model, as well as, a test for the significance of a set of predictors
                                                
10 Prisoners are often plaintiffs in free exercise cases but almost always lose on the basis
of their incarceration.  The courts generally find for the defendant (the prison or state) on
the basis of maintaining good order within the prison community.
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controlling for other effects” (Demaris 1992, 1).  In addition the use of the LOGIT model
allows for the results to be translated into an odds ratio or the probability of a favorable
result.
LOGIT is derived from the natural logarithm of the odds in which the odds is the
probability of an event happening (Spaeth and Segal 1992).  The LOGIT analysis in this
model allows one to ascertain the odds of a liberal vote in religious liberty cases given all
independent variables.  The log odds of a liberal vote in religious liberty cases are given
as a linear function of a judge’s age, gender, race, religion and so forth.
The dependent variable, liberal vote, was run against the independent variables of
date of birth, gender, race, religion, federal government as the antireligious plaintiff and
anti religious defendant, circuit, region, judicial experience, and appointing president.
The results of the LOGIT analysis determine an estimation of the contribution each
independent variable makes to the likelihood that the judges vote will be liberal in
religious liberty cases.
Previous works have looked at personal attributes and case characteristics in a
variety of case types.  No previous work has incorporated personal attributes into a study
specifically examining religious liberty cases.
Hypothesis 1. Female judges are more likely to vote liberally or to constrict religion.
Gender has not been a significant influence on judicial voting behavior with the
exception of personal rights or liberty claims.  With this is mind it is expected that
women will vote more liberal or in a positive direction in religious liberty cases than their
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male counterparts.  This is expected because of the perceived differences in the
socialization of men and women.
Gender was coded for each judge with male judges being coded with a 0 a female
judges being coded with a 1.
Hypothesis 2.  Judges who claim the Democratic Party at the time of appointment to the
Court of Appeals are more likely to vote liberally or to constrict religion.
Party affiliation is an important factor in predicting voting behavior of judges.
Party affiliation is expected to have an impact on the way judges’ vote in religious liberty
cases because party affiliation and ideology may simply become a part of the judicial
decision-making process. The expectation is that judges claiming the Democratic Party
will vote to more liberal or in a positive direction in religious liberty cases.
Party for each judge was listed as the party affiliation each claimed at the time of
appointment.  Those claiming the Republican Party were coded 0 while those claiming
the Democratic Party were coded 1.
Hypothesis 3.  Judges who serve on the Fourth, Fifth and Tenth Circuit Courts are more
likely to vote conservatively or to expand religion or a religious activity while judges
who serve on the First, Seventh, and D.C. Circuit Courts are more likely to vote liberally
or to constrict religion11.
Prior research has shown that the Fourth, Fifth, and Tenth Circuits tend to be
more conservative than the other Circuit Courts while the First, Seventh, and D.C. Circuit
38
Courts tend to be more liberal than the other circuit courts.  It is expected the First,
Seventh, or D.C. Circuit Courts will vote more liberally in religious liberty cases and the
Fourth, Fifth and Tenth Circuits will vote more conservatively in religious liberty cases
than the other circuit courts because of regional ideology and its influence on judges.
 In order to code the Circuit two dummy variables were created:  conservative and
liberal.  Cases that were heard by the Fourth, Fifth and Tenth Circuit Courts were coded 0
under the liberal variable and 1 under the conservative variable.  Cases that were heard by
the First, Seventh, or D.C. Circuit Courts were coded 1 under the liberal variable and 0
under the conservative variable.  Cases not heard in the First, Fourth, Fifth, Seventh, or
D.C. Courts were coded 0 for both variables.
Hypothesis 4.  Minority judges are more likely to vote liberally or to constrict religion.
Research is limited on race and its affect on judicial decision making in non-
criminal cases.  It is therefore an important variable to study.  It is expected that minority
judges, that is judges who are African America, Hispanic American, and Asian
American, will vote more liberally than their white or Caucasian counterparts will in
religious liberty cases.
Race was coded as Caucasian or minority.  Minority judges are those judges who
are African American, Hispanic American, Asian American or Native American were
coded as 1 while Caucasian judges were coded 0.
                                                                                                                                                
11 Liberal courts were chosen by using the results from Carp and Rowland’s 1983 study.
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Hypothesis 5.  Judges ruling in cases in which the federal government is involved are
more likely to vote in favor of the government’s position.
Research shows that upperdogs have an advantage in the judicial system.  Those
plaintiffs or defendants that are either the government or government related are more
likely to win in court.  It is therefore expected that in those cases in which the federal
government is involved, judges will be more likely to vote for the government’s position.
For cases in which the federal government was involved, the case was coded as to
what side the government represented:  plaintiff or defendant as well as whether the
government was in favor of or against the religious activity in question.  Therefore the
case may have been coded as federal government as religious defendant, federal
government as anti-religious defendant, federal government as religious plaintiff or
federal government as anti-religious plaintiff.  In addition, it was noted as to whether the
federal government won or lost each case in which it was involved.
Hypothesis 6.  Judges who claim a conservative or evangelical religious affiliation are
more likely to vote conservatively or to expand religion or religious activity.
Religious background of judges may be an important variable in predicting
outcome in civil rights and liberty cases in general and may be of great use in religious
liberty cases.  Religion is a socialization factor, maybe more so than the other variables in
this study and it is therefore reasonable to expect that judges who claim a conservative or
evangelical religion will vote more conservatively in religious liberty cases because they
desire to protect religion.
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Religion is a difficult variable to code.  The definitions for this study followed the
pattern of the work done by Kellstedt and Green (1983) in which they classify religious
denominations by their “comparable beliefs and ethos” (p. 58).12  Judges claiming a
Protestant denomination not listed in Kellstedt and Green’s study were coded as
Protestant.  To code religion13 four dummy variables were created: Protestant,
Evangelical, Roman Catholic, and Jewish.    Those judges who claimed association with
one of these denominations or religions were coded one for that variable and zero for all
other dummy variables.  The variable Protestant was excluded from the LOGIT model
and therefore all remaining religion variables are estimates relative to those of
“protestant” judges.
Hypothesis 7.  Judges who have prior judicial experience before coming to the Court of
Appeals are more likely to vote liberally or to constrict religion.
Previous works on the affect of judicial experience on the decision-making
process at the Appellate Court level are limited and most do not include the prior
experience of lower court judges.  The previous judicial experience of Appellate Court
judges may be limited, but may also be a determining factor for voting in religious liberty
cases.  Those who have federal judicial experience may feel less constrained by precedent
or may not be a conscious of their position.
                                                
12 For a more complete understanding of how they divided the religious groups and sects
see Kellstedt and Green 1993, pages 57-58.
13 For many judges religion was not available due to “lack of response to questionnaire”
in the Zuk, Barrow and Gryski dataset or lack of availability of information for judges
appointed after 1994.
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Judges in this work were coded as “1” for prior federal judicial experience or “0”
for no prior federal judicial experience.
Hypothesis 8.  Judges who are from the South are more likely to vote conservatively or to
expand religion or religious activity.
Studies have shown regional differences in the way judges’ vote in certain types
of cases.  As children, judges are socialized where they live and many, if not most, judges
are appointed to the bench in areas close to where they live  (Carp and Rowland 1984).
In addition, judges are influenced by the political happenings around them that may not
be common in other parts of the country.  It is the expectation of this study that judges
from the south are more likely to vote conservatively in religious liberty cases.
Three dummy variables were created: south, Confederate, and border.  These
variables were then coded based on the sectional lines created by the Civil War.  The
Confederate includes the Confederate States of South Carolina, Alabama, Florida,
Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, Texas, Virginia, Arkansas, North Carolina, and
Tennessee.  The south includes all states included in Deep South as well as the border-
states of Maryland, Delaware, Kentucky and Missouri.  Non-south includes all other
states as well as the territory of Puerto Rico.  This was done to determine if there is a
difference in voting behavior between former Confederate States and southern states.
Hypothesis 9:  Judges appointed by Democratic presidents are more likely to vote
liberally or to constrict religion.
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Presidents generally appoint judges to the bench that have similar ideas and
beliefs as their own.  It is therefore the expectation of this study that judges appointed by
Democratic presidents will vote more liberally in religious liberty cases.
To code appointing president eleven dummy variables were created:  FDR, HST,
DDE, JFK, LBJ, RMN, GRF, JEC, RWR, GHB and WJC.  If the judge was appointed by
that president the dummy variable was coded one, otherwise it was coded zero.  FDR was
excluded from the LOGIT model and therefore the remaining presidential appointments




The expectation of this study was that personal attributes and case characteristics
would influence judicial decision-making in religious liberty cases.  The examination of
870 votes by judges of the Courts of Appeals show mixed results.  Though some
variables are significant they are not always in the predicted direction and no model
explains more than 13% of the votes within the model.
Model 1
The result of the LOGIT analysis for all variables shows an R2 value of .1314.
This means that only 13.1% of the votes by judges in the religious liberty cases examined
can be explained by the variables included in the model.  This is a small percentage but
the model still produced some statistically significant variables.
Significant Variables
Region
In the first model, the regional variable used was that of the former Confederacy.
The results from this model show judges from the former Confederate states with a z-
score of .00 in a negative direction (see table 1).  This is interpreted to mean that judges
appointed to circuits within the former Confederacy are more likely to vote
conservatively in religious liberty cases than those from outside the former Confederacy.
Judges from with in the former Confederacy are less likely to vote to restrict or constrict
religious activity than those outside the former Confederacy.  These findings are
consistent with the previous work of Rowland and Carp (1996) in which they concluded
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that there were significant regional differences, especially between the North and the
South.  The variable for former Confederate States will remain statistically significant for
each subsequent model in which it appears.
Table 1:  Full Model with Confederate States
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z|
Race -.231 .4469 -.51 .30
Liberal circuit .1757 .2890 .60 .27
Confederate states -.5989 .2260 -2.65 .00**
Age -.0102 .0152 -.669 .25
Gender 1.004 .4286 2.34 .00**
Prior experience -.0341 .2200 -.15 .43
Catholic -.0079 .2486 -.032 .46
Jewish -.3178 .3066 -1.03 .15
Evangelical .6086 .3922 1.522 .06
Eisenhower -1.944 .9322 -2.08 .01**
GHW Bush -1.462 1.220 -1.19 .11
Ford -1.466 1.096 -1.33 .09
Truman -1.864 1.19 -1.56 .05*
Carter -1.848 .9973 -1.85 .03*
Kennedy -2.343 1.023 -2.28 .01**
LB Johnson -2.349 .9336 -2.51 .00**
Nixon -1.611 .9613 -1.67 .04*
Reagan -1.489 1.07 -1.38 .08
Clinton -1.120 1.308 -.857 .19
Free exercise case 1.640 .286 5.72 .00**
Establishment case -.2071 .220 -.942 .17
Religious Speech case .2096 .4122 .509 .30
Party .0857 .1321 .649 .25
Federal government as an anti-
religious plaintiff
1.2025 .4909 2.44 .00**
N= 538
* = Significant variable
** = Highly significant variable
Gender
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The next significant variable is that of gender.  This study hypothesized that there
is a greater probability of female judges voting in favor of those wishing to constrict
religion.  The z-score for gender in the first model is .00 with a positive coefficient.  This
indicates that female judges are more likely to vote liberal or vote to constrict a religious
activity than their male counterparts.  The results in this model as well as subsequent
models are consistent with previous research on gender.  Results of previous studies vary
with the type of case involved in the work.  In personal rights or liberty cases as well as
government economic involvement, Walker and Barrow (1985) found that male judges
are more likely to vote more conservative than female judges.
Appointing President
Initial results of a model with Presidential party affiliation along with judicial
party affiliation reveal the two variables are highly collinear.  In order to correct for the
problem each appointing president variable was run as a dummy variable and diagnostic
test results revealed multi-colinearity was no longer a problem.  The variables for
appointing president were compared to votes cast by judges appointed by Franklin
Roosevelt and provide interesting results.  It is hypothesized that the probability of
judicial appointments made by Democratic Presidents voting vote against expanding
religious activity is higher than those appointed by Republican Presidents.  Table one
indicates mixed results.  Carter appointees, with a z- score of .01 along with Kennedy
appointees with a z- score of .01 and L.B. Johnson appointees with a z- score of .00 are
all more likely to vote to restrict religion as hypothesized and will remain significant in
subsequent models.  These results are in line with previous research such as Carp and
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Rowland (1983) who found Democratic appointees were more liberal than Republican
appointees.  The more surprising results from this model are Eisenhower appointees, with
a z- score of .01, Truman appointees, with a z- score of .05 and Nixon appointees, with a
z- score of .04 are all more likely to vote to restrict religion as well, which are opposite of
the hypothesis as it was expected that judges appointed by Republican presidents would
vote to protect religion or religious activity.  These last results are in conflict with
previous works, which have not found Republican Appointees particularly likely to vote
liberally, but also point out that judicial appointments are not bound to the ideology of
their appointing president.
Case Type
The variable representing free exercise cases is significant with a z- score of .00
with a positive coefficient.  This is interpreted to mean that there is less of a probability
of a favorable vote to expand or protect religion when the issue is perceived as a free
exercise case.  Though case type was not hypothesized in this study specifically, free
exercise cases will remain a significant indicator of judicial vote in subsequent models.
Litigant Status
The final significant variable in this model is litigant status.  This model included
the federal government as the anti-religious plaintiff with a z- score of .00 with a positive
coefficient.  It was hypothesized that federal governmental involvement would result in a
favorable result for the government.  This first model reveals that it more likely that
judges will vote favorably for the federal government when it is trying to restrict religious
activity.  The federal government receiving a favorable vote supports previous works by
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Gallanter (1974) and Songer and Sheehan (1982) and the variable he federal government




Judges from minority groups were expected to vote more liberally or to constrict
religion more than their Anglo or Caucasian counterparts.  In this model race was not a
statistically significant indicator of judicial behavior with a z- score of .30.  Though the
expectation that minority groups would vote more liberally than Anglo on Caucasian
judges, the results of this work are consistent with previous work completed by Walker
and Barrow (1985).  Walker and Barrow (1985) examined how race affected decisions
involving personal liberties and economic regulation as well as how the law was applied
in criminal cases.  Race may be a factor in the application of law and sentencing of
defendants (Welch et al. 1988 and Welch et al. 1993) but race will remain an
insignificant variable for determining judicial votes in subsequent models in this study.
Circuit
In this first model, the variable liberal circuit was used and was hypothesized that
judges from the first, seventh and D.C. courts would vote to constrict or limit religious
activities.  Liberal circuit was found to be an insignificant indicator of judicial behavior
with a z- score of .27.  This indicates that judges from the First, Seventh and D.C. courts
are no more likely to vote to restrict religious activity than judges from other circuits.
These findings are inconsistent with previous works completed by Carp and Rowland
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(1983 and 1996) in which they found the First, Seventh and D.C. courts were
significantly more liberal than the remaining courts.  The variable representing liberal
circuits will remain insignificant in subsequent models in which it is contained.
Age
The age of a judge was hypothesized to vary inversely with the liberal votes of a
judge; the older the judge is the more likely he or she is to vote conservatively or to
protect religious activities.  The age of the judge had a z- score of .25 in this first model
and will remain insignificant in subsequent models.
Prior Experience
The prior experience a judge brings with him or her to the bench was
hypothesized to influence judicial decision making.  This study hypothesized that judges
with prior federal judicial experience would more often vote to constrict or limit religion.
Prior experience had z- score of .43 and a negative direction in this first model.  This
indicates that prior experience is not a significant indicator of judicial voting.  In addition,
the negative direction of the results indicates that prior experience may influence judges
to vote more conservatively.  These results support previous examinations of prior
experience by Bowen (1965), Goldman (1966) and Nagel (1973) which show prior
experience had little or no impact of judicial decision making at the Court of Appeals




This first model produced no significant results in the area of religious affiliation.
It was hypothesized that judges claiming an evangelical faith at the time of appointment
would vote more conservatively than their Jewish or Catholic counterparts.  Evangelical
judges had a z – score of .06 in a positive direction, while Catholic judges had a z- score
of .46 in a negative direction and Jewish judges had a z- score of .15 in a negative
direction.  These results, though statistically insignificant, are opposite the expected
results.  The negative direction of Catholic and Jewish judges along with the positive
direction of the Evangelical judges is opposite from existing work. The results of
religious affiliation in this study do not support previous works.  This discrepancy,
though unusual may not be without cause.  Previous studies examined death penalty,
gender discrimination and obscenity cases (Songer and Tabrizi 1999) but did not focus on
religious liberty cases.  It may be that case type plays an important role in how religious
affiliation affects judicial decision- making.
In the remaining models Catholic and Jewish judges will remain insignificant in
predicting the voting behavior of judges.
Appointing Presidents
The variables for appointing president were compared to votes cast by judges
appointed by Franklin Roosevelt and provide interesting results.  It is hypothesized that
the probability of judicial appointments made by Democratic Presidents voting vote
against expanding religious activity is higher than those appointed by Republican
Presidents.  Table one indicates a few appointing presidents are significant indicators of
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judicial decision making while several are not.  G.H.W. Bush, with a z – score of .11,
Ford, with a z- score of .09, Reagan, with a z-score of .08 and Clinton with a z- score of
.19 are all insignificant in predicting judicial decision- making.  The results of GHW
Bush and Reagan appointees voting more conservatively are consistent with Carp and
Rowland’s (1983 and 1996) findings, but Clinton appointees voting patterns are not.
Party
The party a judge claimed at time of appointment to the Court of Appeals was
expected to be an indicator of judicial behavior.  It was expected that judges claiming the
Democratic Party would vote to constrict religious activity more often than those judges
claiming the Republican Party.  Party was statistically insignificant in this model with a
z- score of .25.  Previous works including party have resulted in party being a highly
significant predictor of judicial decision-making (Goldman 1975; Carp and Rowland
1983; Rowland and Carp 1996).  The results here do not support these previous works
and will continue to be insignificant in subsequent models
Model Two
 A second analysis of the data included the variable for border-states instead of
former Confederate States.  This change in variables provided a R2 value of .1266.  Table
2 represents a slightly lower explanatory model of 12.6% or only 12.6% of the votes by
judges in the religious liberty cases examined can be explained by the variables included
in the model.
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Table 2:  Full Model with Border States
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z|
Race -.2068 .4461 -.46 .32
Liberal circuit .2522 .2856 .88 .18
Border states .6148 .3279 1.87 .03*
Age -.0114 .0152 -.75 .22
Gender .9607 .4216 2.27 .01*
Prior experience -.0691 .2192 .31 .32
Catholic -.0805 .2446 .32 .37
Jewish -.2445 .3051 -.80 .21
Evangelical .6095 .3914 1.55 .05*
Eisenhower -1.9147 .9340 -2.05 .02*
GHW Bush -1.3928 1.2140 -1.14 .12
Ford -1.5433 1.0881 -1.41 .07
Truman -1.8426 1.2120 -1.52 .06
Carter -1.8463 .9989 -1.84 .03*
Kennedy -2.3962 1.0305 -2.32 .01**
LB Johnson -2.3862 .9360 -2.54 .01**
Nixon -1.5861 .9613 -1.65 .04*
Reagan -1.4088 1.0741 -1.31 .09
Clinton -.9652 1.3055 -.73 .23
Free exercise case 1.6143 .2862 5.64 .00**
Establishment case -.1998 .2190 -.91 .18
Religious speech case .2306 .4130 .55 .28
Party .0753 .1194 .63 .26
Federal government as an anti-
religious plaintiff
1.254 .4834 2.59 .00**
N= 538
* = Significant variable
** = Highly significant variable
Significant Variables
Region
The inclusion of border-states in the second model was found to be significant.  It was
hypothesized that judges in the South would vote more conservatively than those outside
of the south.  Border states, which includes Kentucky, Maryland, Delaware and Missouri,
were included to try to determine if there is a difference between judicial decision-
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making in Southern states and the former Confederacy.  Judges from border-states, with a
z- score of .03 with a positive coefficient, are more likely to vote to constrict religion or
religious activities.
Religion
Judges claiming evangelical religions is significant in the second model with a z –
score of .05 with a positive coefficient.  Again, it was hypothesized that judges claiming
an evangelical faith at the time of appointment would vote more conservatively than their




In the second model Truman appointees had a z- score of .06.  Truman appointees
with border-states in the model are no longer a statistically significant indicator of
judicial voting behavior.  This may be because of the location of appointments by made
Truman.  This may also be explained by the fact that Truman was not as concerned about
ideology in the appointments he made to the bench.
Model Three
A third model, represented in Table 3, included the variable Southern states in
place of border-states or Confederate states.  This model has a lower explanatory power
than the first two models with a R2 value of .1166 or the third model explains 11.6% of




The variable for Southern States is included in the third model and has a z- score
of .02 with a negative direction.  This is in line with the hypothesis that judges from
Southern States will vote more conservatively or to protect religion or religious activity.
Table 3:  Full Model with Southern States (Border and Confederate Combined)
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z|
Race -.3181 .4417 -.72 .23
Liberal circuit .2908 .2748 1.05 .14
Southern states .4087 .1992 -2.05 .02*
Age -.0062 .0149 -.42 .33
Gender .9719 .4213 2.30 .01*
Prior experience -.0329 .2149 -.15 .43
Catholic -.0148 .2424 .06 .47
Jewish -.3041 .2995 -1.01 .15
Evangelical .6409 .3821 1.67 .04*
Eisenhower -1.9895 .9195 -2.16 .01**
GHW Bush -1.745 1.1954 -1.46 .07
Ford -1.6304 1.0708 -1.52 .06
Truman -1.7843 1.1876 -1.50 .06
Carter -1.9517 .9804 -1.99 .02*
Kennedy -2.2347 1.0001 -2.23 .01**
LB Johnson -2.3011 .9208 -2.49 .00**
Nixon -1.7242 .9438 -1.82 .03*
Reagan -1.6305 1.0567 -1.54 .06
Clinton -1.3419 1.2899 -1.04 .14
Free exercise case 1.5993 .2772 5.76 .00**
Establishment case -.1332 .2147 -.62 .26
Religious speech case .1476 .4083 .36 .35
Party .05321 .2147 .45 .32
Federal government as an anti-
religious plaintiff
1.0494 .4083 2.16 .01**
N= 563
* = Significant variable




In the third model Truman appointees remained insignificant with a z- score of
.06.  Truman appointees with Southern States in the model are no longer a statistically
significant indicator of judicial voting behavior.
Model Four
In the fourth analysis of the data the variable Liberal Circuit was replaced by
variable Conservative Circuit and the variable Federal Government as the Anti-Religious
Plaintiff was replaced by the variable Federal Government as the Anti-Religious
Defendant.  In addition the variable for former Confederate States has replaced Liberal




This study hypothesized that judges on the fourth, fifth and tenth circuit courts
would vote more conservatively or to expand or protect religion more often than judges
on other courts.  The Conservative Circuit variable in model 4 has a z – score of .03 and a
negative direction thus indicating a conservative vote or a more probably vote to protect




The fourth model has Truman appointees with a z-score of .05.  With the
inclusion of Conservative Circuit and former Confederate States Truman, appointees are
more likely to vote liberally or to constrict religion.  Again, Truman may be affected by
the location of his appointments to the bench.  It may be the Truman appointed more
judges to Conservative Circuits or former Confederate states.  The inconsistency of
Truman appointees implies a need for further study on his appointees.
Table 4:  Full Model with Federal Government as Anti-Religious Defendant, Confederate
States, Conservative Circuit and without Party
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z|
Race -.3346 .4525 -.73 .23
Conservative circuit -.4679 .2487 -1.88 .03*
Confederate states .4077 .2412 -1.69 .04*
Age -.0100 .0151 -.66 .25
Gender 1.0225 .4303 2.37 .00**
Prior experience -.1053 .2219 -.47 .31
Catholic -.0020 .2454 -.008 .49
Jewish -.4116 .3047 -1.35 .08
Evangelical .6944 .3885 1.78 .03*
Eisenhower -1.8322 .9202 -1.99 .02*
GHW Bush -1.5480 1.1912 -1.30 .09
Ford -1.5434 1.0804 -1.42 .07
Truman -1.9027 1.1889 -1.60 .05*
Carter -1.8059 .9828 -1.83 .03*
Kennedy -2.1334 1.0118 -2.10 .01**
LB Johnson -2.331 .9298 -2.50 .00**
Nixon -1.5446 .9384 -1.64 .05*
Reagan -1.5694 1.0519 -1.49 .06
Clinton -1.1193 1.2880 -.86 .19
Free exercise case 1.6348 .2866 5.70 .00**
Establishment case -.1584 .2214 -.71 .23
Religious speech case .0827 .4115 .20 .42
Federal government as an anti-
religious defendant
.1014 .2769 .36 .35
N= 538
* = Significant variable




The federal government as an anti-religious defendant has a z – score of .35 in a
positive direction.  Though it is statistically insignificant the direction of the results
indicates a liberal vote, which is in accordance with the hypothesis that the federal
government would be more likely to win if involved in a case.
Model 5
Table 5 indicates an analysis of the data with the case type and party of judge
removed.  Dropping the case type and party reduces the explanatory power of the model
to 6.4%.
Table 5:  Full Model without Case Type or Party
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z|
Race -.1603 .4249 -.37 .35
Liberal circuit .1229 .2732 .45 .32
Confederate states .5064 .2157 -2.34 .00**
Age -.0079 .0144 -.55 .27
Gender .8655 .3992 2.16 .01**
Prior experience -.0367 .2078 -.17 .43
Catholic -.0795 .2336 .34 .36
Jewish -.2022 .2941 -.68 .24
Evangelical .5593 .3782 1.47 .06
Eisenhower -1.8328 .9108 -2.01 .02*
GHW Bush -1.9657 1.1679 -1.68 .04*
Ford -1.7524 1.0478 -1.67 .04*
Truman -1.9428 1.1480 -1.69 .04*
Carter -1.9984 .9716 -2.05 .02*
Kennedy -2.5072 .9906 -2.53 .00**
LB Johnson -2.4034 .9105 -2.64 .00**
Nixon -1.9662 .9295 -2.11 .01**




Clinton -1.3225 1.2634 -1.04 .14
Federal government as an anti-
religious plaintiff
1.2567 .4690 2.67 .00**
N= 538
* = Significant variable
** = Highly significant variable
Significant Variables
Appointing Presidents
Removing the case type and party makes adds G.H.W. Bush appointees
significant with a z- score of .04 and Ford appointees significant with a z –score of .04.
Insignificant Variables
Religion
Model 5, with case type and party removed, shows judges claiming evangelical
religions with a z- score of.06.
Model 6
A sixth model with the party affiliation of judges removed produces a R2 value of
.1306.  This model explains about 13% of the votes within the model (see table 6).
Significant Variables
Religion
Again, in this model, judges claiming evangelical faiths are significant with a z-
score of  .05 in a positive direction.
Insignificant Variables
Appointing President
Model 6 shows Truman to be insignificant with a z- score of .06.
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Table 6:  Full Model without Party
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z|
Race -.2211 .4460 -.492 .31
Liberal circuit .17298 .2891 .59 .27
Confederate states .5911 .2255 -2.62 .00**
Age -.0096 .0152 -.63 .26
Gender 1.0205 .4286 2.38 .00**
Prior experience -.0386 .2200 -.17 .43
Catholic .0063 .2477 .02 .49
Jewish -.3105 .3066 -1.01 .15
Evangelical .6146 .3926 1.56 .05*
Eisenhower -2.0172 .9253 -2.18 .01*
GHW Bush -1.5671 1.2101 -1.29 .09
Ford -1.5574 1.0865 -1.43 .07
Truman -1.8550 1.1940 -1.55 .06
Carter -1.8613 .9972 -1.86 .03*
Kennedy -2.3423 1.0234 -2.28 .01**
LB Johnson -2.3609 .9336 -2.52 .00**
Nixon -1.6914 .9530 -1.77 .03*
Reagan -1.5757 1.0678 -1.47 .07
Clinton -1.1517 1.309 -.88 .18
Free exercise case 1.6340 .2860 5.71 .00**
Establishment case -.2085 .2199 -.94 .17
Religious speech case .2000 .4119 .48 .31
Federal government as an anti-
religious plaintiff
1.1976 .4906 2.44 .00**
N= 538
* = Significant variable
** = Highly significant variable
Model 7
A seventh model, which omits the appointing president variable produces an R2
value of .0969 or explains 9.6% of the votes within the model (see table 7).   The results
in this model show no differences from previous models with the exception of the
explanatory power.
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Table 7:  Full Model without Appointing Presidents
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z|
Race -.3239 .4291 -.75 .22
Liberal circuit .2880 .2648 1.08 .13
Southern states .4405 .1959 -2.24 .01*
Age -.0102 .0066 -1.53 .06
Gender 1.0020 .4142 2.41 .00**
Prior experience -.0296 .2008 -.14 .44
Catholic -.0007 .2326 .003 .49
Jewish -.4004 .2865 -1.39 .08
Evangelical .5532 .3770 1.46 .07
Free exercise case 1.5260 .2703 5.64 .00**
Establishment case -.1972 .2123 -.92 .17
Religious speech case .1096 .3965 .27 .39
Party .0046 .0905 .05 .47
Federal government as an anti-
religious plaintiff
1.0385 .4784 2.17 .01**
N= 563
* = Significant variable
** = Highly significant variable
Model 8
Model eight does not include the religious affiliation of the judges.  This model
explains 10.4% of the votes within the model with a R2 value of .1045.  Model 8
produced no results that differed from previous models with the exception of the
explanatory power.
Table 8:  Full Model without Religion
Variable Coeff. Std. Err. Z P>|z|
Race -.0777 .3800 -.20 .41
Conservative circuit -.33902 .2288 -1.48 .06
Confederate states -.4874 .2256 -2.16 .01**
Age -.0149 .0131 -1.13 .12
Gender .7341 .3453 2.12 .01**




Eisenhower -1.6208 .9104 -1.78 .03*
GHW Bush -1.1447 1.1068 -1.03 .15
Ford -1.0881 1.0336 -1.05 .14
Truman -2.0037 1.1785 -1.70 .04*
Carter -1.5115 .9315 -1.62 .05*
Kennedy -1.9873 .9857 -2.01 .02*
LB Johnson -2.1874 .8929 -2.45 .00**
Nixon -1.3017 .90772 -1.43 .07
Reagan -1.2581 .9970 -1.26 .10
Clinton -1.4197 1.1380 -1.24 .10
Free exercise case 1.4052 .2616 5.37 .00**
Establishment case -.2391 .2068 -1.15 .12
Religious speech case .1264 .3841 .32 .37
Party .0894 .1362 .65 .25
Federal government as an anti-
religious defendant
.0296 .2621 .11 .45
N= 586
* = Significant variable
** = Highly significant variable
Summary
The overall results of this work are very interesting.  A few models produced
expected results such as female judges casting more liberal votes than male judges.
Other predicted results include regional differences, with southern judges casting more
conservative votes than the non-southern judges as well as conservative circuits voting in
a conservative manner.  Unexpected results include judges of evangelical faiths casting
more liberal votes than was hypothesized and Republican appointees, specifically
Eisenhower, Truman and Nixon voting more liberal than expected.  The above results
were mixed and this may be due to the fact that this study focused specifically on




The purpose of this study was to determine if personal attributes along with
specific case characteristics influenced the voting behavior of Courts of Appeals judges.
The results above show that only a few predicted variables such as gender, federal
governmental involvement and case type influenced judicial decision-making.
Though the statistical results and explanatory power of this study are relatively
low it has produced a few surprising results.  The most surprising result is Eisenhower
appointments voting more liberally than Carter or Clinton appointees.  The assumption
was that judges appointed by Democratic presidents would vote more liberally than those
appointed by Republican presidents.  Eisenhower appointees tending to vote more
liberally than recent democratic presidential appointees may not be all that surprising if
the time period is controlled.  The political spectrum from 1970s forward looks different
than the political spectrum prior to 1970.  Political ideology is increasingly moderate,
with little political differences between republicans and democrats.  As both parties move
toward the center of the political spectrum, the differences in ideology of judicial
appointments tends to be less as well.
A second surprising result is the lack of influence of religious background on
judicial decision-making.  Religion is considered to be an influential socialization factor
and, at least in this study, has no statistically significant influence.  This may be due to a
couple of reasons.  First, religion may not be time-bound.  Judges appointed in the last
twenty-five years may be less influenced by their religious backgrounds than those
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appointed prior to the 1970s.  A second explanation for the lack of influence of religious
background may be due to the lack of data concerning judges’ religious background.  The
researcher was unable to find the religious background of judges appointed after 1994.
Another interesting result found in this study was the inclusion of case type.  Free
exercise cases were highly significant in every model.  In looking at the results, it is
interesting to note that the judges in this study voted to limit free exercise in every model.
One explanation for this may be the types of cases included in this study.  Many of the
cases termed “free exercise” consisted of conscientious objectors, tax deferments for
church related property or church related services, as well as religious exercises in public
schools.
Finally, the appearance of the federal government in religious liberty cases is a
highly significant variable.  Whether the government was acting as the anti-religious
plaintiff or defendant did not matter.  If the government was involved in a religious
liberty case, the government received a favorable ruling a statistically significant amount
of the time.
Personal attributes affect judicial decision making in other case types and
therefore it can be inferred that personal attributes should affect decisions in religious
liberty cases.  A few variables in this research, such as gender, region and federal
government involvement behaved the way they were expected, but most other variables
did not.  Overall, the conclusions of this study show that judges at the Courts of Appeals
level are relatively faithful to the written law and precedents set down by the Supreme
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